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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report describes the emergence of a new political force in 
the transport planning process in Winnipeg. Responding to neighbourhood 
disruption threatened by major railway and freeway plans, a citizen 
l 
organization known as c.o.s.T. (Coalition On Sensible Transport) was 
formed in January 1973. Production of numerous technical critiques and 
an active campaign of public debate followed for the next six months, 
which concluded in a significant reversal of city policy. 
But the c.o.s.T. activity was only one factor in a large number of 
competing pressures and historical events. Chapters two and three provide 
the context, tracing the planning process through a period of growing 
centralization from the post war period to the late nineteen sixties, when 
pressures for a more diversified approach began to emerge. The adversary 
function performed by c.o.s.T. was one means of providing this diversity. 
The actual role of the group, as described in Chapter four, was very similar 
in kind, though not in magnitude, to that of the Spadina protesters in 
1 Toronto and the Boston inner beltway critics of the late sixties. An 
assessment of this role in the context of planning theory is attempted in 
Chapter five, where a parallel is drawn with the concept of advocacy 
2 planning first outlined by an American planner, Paul Davidoff, in 1965. 
1. Lupo, Colcord, Fowler, "Rites of Way: The Politics of Transportation 
in Boston and the u.s. City", Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971. 
2. Davidoff, Paul, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", Journal of the 
American Institute of Planners, Volume XXXI, No. 4, November 1965. 
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2. CENTRALIZATION AND TECHNOCRACY 1946-1968 
The post war period was a time of dramatic change in transport 
planning in the Winnipeg area. For two decades a growing trend towards 
centralization took place in planning technology and institutions. 
Many of the transformations closely parallelled events taking place 
elsewhere, sometimes leading, sometimes following, but always pushed by 
increasing pressures of population growing steadily towards the big city 
mark of half a million. 
2.1 Nineteen Separate Governments 
In 1946 some nineteen separate municipal governments made up 
the Winnipeg area. Special regional bodies existed to administer 
waterworks, sewage, mosquito abatement, and airport services, but 
transport planning on an area-wide basis was virtually non-existent. 
Streets and bridges were planned and paid for by the municipalities in 
which they were built, in spite of the fact that they were freely used 
by all residents of Greater Winnipeg. 3 
The population at this time was, however, only 318,000. With 
only 29,000 registered automobiles in the area, the privately operated 
transit system was profitably carrying 105 million passengers a year, 
4 
more than double the business of five years earlier. In the absence of 
congestion, the chief transport problem involved linking different 
municipalities with bridges and road extensions rather than increasing 
capacity. 
3. Axworthy, Tom, "The Politics of Innovation", in the Future City Report 
No. 2, Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, 1972. 
4. Smith, Wilbur and Associates, "Report on Traffic, Transit Parking, 
Metropolitan Winnipeg", New Haven, Connecticut, 1957. 
3 
2.2 The Planning Commission and the Smith Report 
In response to the need for greater co-ordination, the Metropolitan 
Planning Commission of Greater Winnipeg was formed in 1948. The Commission, 
with representation from the Province and twelve member municipalities, 
was responsible for preparing plans and advising the municipalities, but 
had no power to implement. Under the auspices of this body, a Master Plan 
was prepared by a town planner named Earl Mills. The plan included a 
number of suggestions for rationalizing the street system and building new 
5 thoroughfares. 
But conditions had already begun to change dramatically. The 
automobile era that was sweeping North America had come to Winnipeg and 
was cutting into transit patronage, thus creating pressures for government 
reorganization. 
In 1953 the private transit company passed into public ownership 
under a special area-wide body called the Greater Winnipeg Transit 
Commission. Some modernization, rationalization and extension of services 
followed, but the enterprise was continued on a self-supporting basis 
6 despite the large loss of business that had occurred. 
By 1956 the population of the Greater Winnipeg Area had risen to 
410,000, expanding into rapidly growing suburbs. Auto registrations had 
almost tripled from a decade earlier, the number of annual and transit 
rides had plummeted to 71 million revenue passengers from the 1946 peak. 7 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
4 
About the same time, faced with similar problems throughout the 
States, the u.s. Congress passed a bill expanding the interstate highway 
system to make major connecting routes through urban areas eligible for 
ninety percent federal funding. 8 This bill was to have far-reaching 
effects on the field of urban transport planning by creating demands 
for increasingly sophisticated techniques of area-wide planning, and a 
market for a new breed of transportation consultants. 
In Winnipeg, the Planning Commission, concerned about the prospects 
of the trends continuing, appointed an American consulting firm, Wilbur 
Smith and Associates, to prepare a transport plan and outline programs 
to meet the present, intermediate and long-term needs of the area. 9 
Smith conducted surveys to determine the origins and destinations 
of existing traffic travelling into and out of the downtown area. He 
included surveys of transit usage, parking, and also traffic counts and 
travel time studies on several major arteries. This information was 
assembled and used as the basis for a series of recommendations on traffic 
management, parking policy, and transit routing procedures. 
Although the surveys indicated only a few streets to be near 
free-flow capacity in the rush hour periods, the object of the study had 
also been very much to provide forecasts of future problems, and to make 
recommendations for programs to handle them. Using newly developed 
techniques of long-range planning, the survey information was factored up 
to account for an expanding population, and to reflect observed trends of 
increasing car ownership and falling transit patronage. 
8. Lupo, Colcord, Fowler, op.cit. 
9. Smith, Wilbur and Associates, op.cit. 
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Based on these traffic forecasts, intermediate and more long-run 
investment projects were proposed. A number of the thoroughfares and 
bridge recommendations made by Earl Mills in the Master Plan were 
incorporated to form a base road arterial system. For the longer term, 
in order to meet the newly anticipated problem of congestion, several 
roads were proposed to increase the capacity of the existing system. 
Partly due to the downtown-oriented surveys, and to the growth projections 
of downtown through traffic, a loop.expressway was planned to by-pass 
* the downtown area. Coming into this was a radial expressway from the 
West, and another from the North designed to meet expected increases 
from expanding suburbs. Another circumferential route of arterial 
standard about five miles from the city centre, later to be known as the 
suburban beltway, was also proposed. 
The study was published December 15, 1957, and included, besides 
the above, a strong recommendation that a regional government structure 
with sufficient spending power would be necessary to implement the costly 
plans. It is interesting to reflect on the techniques and philosophy 
behind this report because, although it was soon to be superceded by yet 
another study, it was, nonetheless, to provide a continuing and important 
influence through the succeeding decade. 
A number of thoroughfare and bridge projects contained in the 
plan were implemented, and property acquisition was, in fact, begun along 
the suburban circumferential route in the period prior to completion of 
the next report in 1968. In addition, the beltway concept plus the 
Northern and Western freeways were incorporated into the later report, all 
* See Diagram I. 
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with high-priority ranking in the proposed implementation program. The 
Northern freeway was altered, but the concept of a new bridge crossing 
the C.P.R. railyards in north-central Winnipeg was retained, and was 
later to become a focus and catalyst for much of the emerging transport 
debate of later years. 
Technically, while a considerable advance from the earlier ad hoc 
approach, the study was quite primitive compared to present day methods. 
The surveys were incomplete, accounting primarily for those trips which 
pass through the downtown cordon, and missing travel between districts 
outside the downtown. Forecasting relied on crude projections of existing 
trends with little effort to determine underlying causes. For instance, 
the rapid decline in transit patronage from 105 million rides in 1946 to 
71 million in 1956 was assumed to continue at the same rate, resulting 
in 43 million rides by 1970, and 40 million by 1981. As it happens, the 
decline ended in 1962, and levelled off at around 60 million for the rest 
of the sixties, despite a far lower population growth than Smith had 
. d 10 proJecte • Finally, little effort was made to relate the capacity of 
the proposed new roads in any explicit way to the forecast increases in 
traffic, or to predict the effect the new roads might have on travel times 
and speeds. 
While techniques had not then been developed to do this in a more 
systematic way, the report was nonetheless symptomatic of the prevailing 
philosophy of the time. It gives the impression of a purely technical 
10. Canadian Good Roads Association, "Urban Transportation Developments 
in Eleven Canadian Hetropolitan Areas", Ottawa, Canadian Good Roads 
Association, 1966. 
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view of planning, with an underlying bias in favour of the automobile. 
The trend towards the private car was assumed inevitable, and the proposal 
was to accommodate it at any cost. The study proposed one policy, without 
comparing it to alternatives. No attempt was made to cost the program, 
or to suggest any real measure of benefits. With the technical problem 
solved, all that was then needed was an institutional framework having 
appropriate financial powers to effect the implementation. 
2.3 Regional Government and WeA.T.S. 
Moves toward a regional government structure were in fact already 
under way. The Provincial Government had appointed the Greater Winnipeg 
Investigating Commission back in 1955 to look into the question of local 
government reorganization. The commission completed its report in 1959, 
and on November 1, 1960, a new metropolitan form of government took 
office by virtue of a Provincial Act. 11 
It was a two-tier structure that retained the nineteen area 
municipalities, but with reduced responsibilities of a local nature. The 
Metropolitan Council had ten members directly elected from pie-shaped 
districts especially chosen to encourage an area-wide rather than local 
approach. The Metro Council had sole authority over planning and zoning. 
It took over most of the regional special bodies, and it was charged with 
preparing a development plan including a long-term nlan for transport. 
The programs were to be financed by direct levies on the municipalities. 
Early in its term, the Metropolitan Corporation formed a joint Streets and 
Transit Division that was unique in North America, and reflected advanced 
11. Axworthy, Tom, op.cit. 
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notions of urban organizational theory. Integration was now in effect 
geographically and functionally. 
Throughout the sixties, the transportation division was very 
active. In 1962, data collection began for phase I of the Winnipeg Area 
Transportation Study (W.A.T.S.). 12 A firm of private consultants knotvn 
as Traffic Research Corporation from Toronto "t.rho had pioneered several 
developments in land-use transport study techniques, was retained to do 
the analytical work. For the next six years new and more sophisticated 
methods were to occupy the planners before publication of the third and 
final phase. And this time they would report to a client ~nth the 
authority to implement rather than simply advise. 
In 1962, Metro also paid its first subsidy to the transit system, 
beginnin~ a decade of increasing subsidies and a commitment to view 
transit as a public service and an integral part of the overall transport 
plan, rather than just another business left to live or die on its market 
performance. This action undoubtedly helped assist the decline in transit 
use that had been occurring, and in so doing, eased growing pressures on 
the road system. It was progressive thinking for those times, and may 
have been due in part to the functional integration of streets and transit 
as a single institution. 
But new institutions and new methods aside, the long-range transport 
planners were still heavily favouring the automobile. On July 8, 1964, 
before the data collection had been completed or even analyzed, a progress 
report on W.A.T.S. was presented to Metro Council. Getting somewhat ahead 
12. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater 't\Tinnipeg, ,.The Hinnipeg Area 
Transportation Study", Three Volumes, September 1968. 
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of itself, the report predicted that the final study might show a need 
for a suburban beltway plus eight radial freeways coming into the downtown 
at a total estimated cost of 250 million dollars. 
By this time, the area population was approaching the half million 
mark, and several programs were not waiting for the study's completion. 
Property acquisition was beginning along the proposed beltway route and 
a number of thoroughfare and bridge projects outlined in the Smith study 
were being constructed. Extensions of a new Osborne Bridge over the Red 
River and the Disraeli Bridge through residential areas were creating 
some local protest. In 1964 Metro had begun to negotiate with the 
Canadian National Railways about the possible removal of some increasingly 
obsolescent tracks at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers, and 
possible creation of a scenic drive along the Red if the mainline were to 
go. By 1966 discussions had also begun with senior governments concerning 
a new bridge over the C.P.R. tracks in north central Winnipeg, called the 
Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass. Both issues were to feature importantly in 
the debate of the early seventies. 
In April 1965 the data collection phase of the W.A.T.s. was 
completed and, although the forecasting and comparison of alternatives had 
hardly begun, the planners were now happily predicting the need for a 
road program with five radial freeways. Volumes one and two of the W.A.T.S., 
which dealt with data collection and with analysis of the existing 
situation, were not even published until February and July of 1966. The 
third and final volume of W.A.T.S. published in September 1968 after an 
extensive process of analysis did, in fact, recommend a plan with five 
* radial freeways very similar to the plan described three years earlier. 
* See Diagram II. 
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The W.A.T.S. was technically far superior to its predecessor, 
incorporating many of the theoretical advances that had been encouraged 
by the U.S. Federal commitment to urban transport of the fifties. Surveys 
were conducted at all area households rather than on those cars that 
happened to pass into and out of the downtown, thus providing a more 
comprehensive trip coverage although still limited to the work journey. 
Instead of the simple trend analysis of travel habits used in the 
Smith report, an attempt was made to discover from survey data the 
reasons for trip-making of various sorts, and to project the probable 
future condition of these reasons before forecasting final trips. 
Five alternative investment schemes with varying mixes of public 
and private transport were tested. For each of the networks, the effects 
on trip-making, travel times and modal choice were estimated. Finally, 
the networks were each priced, giving a comparison between costs and 
performance in terms of travel time and congestion relief. From the five 
schemes tested, the study team recommended one scheme costing 767 million 
dollars over a twenty-four-year period. The scheme included the five radial 
freeways and the Smith circumferential route, upgraded to freeway standard 
and named the "suburban beltway". The ingredients for sound decision-
making seemed to be at hand. 
In January of 1969 there were some releases of the study findings 
to the media, and a presentation was made to the Manitoba Transportation 
Conference. The high cost of the scheme and the need for Provincial and 
Federal support was quickly established, soon after Which Metro began 
formal approaches to the Province about cost sharing. On February 27, 1969, 
the W.A.T.S. report was formally presented to Metro Council. There were 
13 
~etailed newspaper reports describing the recommendations, some opposition 
from Councillor Art Coulter concerning the destructive effects of the 
Western Freeway, and then Council proceeded to characteristically discuss 
the matter behind closed doors. 
For the rest of that year little was heard of W.A.T.S. There were 
newspaper reports about continuing expropriations along the beltway route, 
and as early as April expropriation had begun on Whittier Park on the 
Eastern Freeway route. This was bitterly contested by the owner, but 
little other reaction was heard or connection drawn with the rest of the 
program. 
Towards the end of the year a controversy developed between the 
newly elected Provincial Highways Minister, Joe Borowski, and Metro over 
the expropriation on the beltway route. The arguments centered around 
charges of profiteering in land sales, but little was said about the pros 
and cons of the project itself. 
With little further public discussion, the Metro councillors 
emerged from behind their closed doors, and approved the recommended scheme 
as official policy on May 14, 1970. What went on behind the doors is 
anyone's guess. It can only be assumed that the councillors were sold by 
the sophisticated and convincing arguments of the planners, who in the 
absence of public debate had a virtual monopoly on expertise. The policy 
was approved with the single dissenting vote of Councillor Staines. It 
was loudly applauded by the Chairman of Metro's Streets and Transit 
Committee, Councillor Lorne Leach of St. Vital, who urged priority for the 
Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass and a St. Vital-Fort Garry bridge crossing 
the Red River on the beltway route. 
14 
It appeared that the regional structure urged by Wilbur Smith 
had finally created and approved a comprehensive long-range transport 
plan to guide the future development of the city in an efficient and 
rational way. The plan was based on a study that incorporated many recent 
technical advances and seemed, on the surface at least, to have corrected 
the philosophical deficiencies of the Smith work by comparing a range of 
alternatives with estimates of cost and performance for each. 
But much of this information was never really used. The traditional 
non-political, non-partisan approach to local government, and the continued 
belief that planning was a technical matter not concerned with finance, 
led Council to approve a plan costing three times the price estimated in 
1964, and well beyond their ability to impose local taxes without creating 
a revolt. It relied on persuasion of senior governments to foot the bill. 
15 
3. TRL~SITION 1969-1971 
The purely technical approach to planning was naive to say the 
least, and featured importantly in a number of events that dominated the 
next two years and helped to uproot and re-orient the planning system 
once again. 
3.1 Local-Regional Conflict 
Throughout the sixties, and almost since its inception, Metro 
had been under attack. Much of this involved bitter infighting with the 
City of Winnipeg, but there was a general complaint from area municipalities 
that, together with education, Metro levies took up to seventy-five percent 
of their budgets, while they had no direct representation on Metro Council. 
Local neighbourhood services were getting short shrift. Commissions were 
set up with little effect in 1962 and 1966 to investigate the problems, 
but the June 1969 election of the N.D.P., pledged to alter the structure, 
put the writing firmly on the wa11. 13 
During 1969 and 1970, the W.A.T.S. program became an important 
part of this debate, with the City of Winnipeg questioning the overall cost, 
how it was to be financed, and asking what sociological and economic studies 
had been done in relation to the plan. The Chairman of Metro's Planning 
Committee, Councillor John w. McGurran, teamed the questions stupid and 
stated that influence would have to be applied to the Province for financial 
assistance, but in the meantime the plans would have to be slowed but should 
not be abandoned. 
13. Axworthy, Tom, op.cit. 
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3.2 Sherbrook-McGregor, The Railway Study, and W.A.T.S. 
Adherence to the grand plan, but at a slowed rate, had in fact 
already begun to produce the first grit in the smoothly oiled planning 
machine. The Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass over the north-central C.P.R. 
yards, first conceived in the 1957 Smith report, had become an integral 
* and high-priority item in the master freeway plan. Imminent closure 
for safety reasons of the ageing Arlington Bridge over the same tracks 
made the project a matter of urgency. As a railway crossing, the 
Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass fell under federal responsibility, so cost 
sharing talks involved the Federal, Provincial and Metro governments. 
Discussions that had begun in 1966 'V7ere reconvened in earnest in 1969, 
but the high cost of 12.5 million dollars for the freeway standard 
crossing was too rich a pastry for the participants to swallow. 
Since Metro and the two railways had in September 1969 already 
begun talks on railway rationalization in the Greater Winnipeg Area, the 
Federal Government suggested that a study should be done to see whether 
the expense of a bridge crossing could be avoided or reduced by removing 
the yards and mainline tracks. The Federal Government 1:-ras contemplating 
legislation that would allow federal contributions towards rail relocation 
costs, and Winnipeg was selected as a location for a pilot study. On 
April 30, 1970, Metro approved in principle the establishment of a joint 
committee of Metro, the Provincial and Federal Governments, C.N.R. and 
C.P.R. to do a rail rationalization study. Consultants Damas and Smith 
were appointed in October 1970 to do the work. 14 
14. City of ivinnipeg, "Railway Study Technical Report", Damas and Smith 
Ltd., May 1972. 
* See Diagram III. 
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But the rail study that had a scope broad enough to include 
rationalization of facilities for the whole Winnipeg area was going to 
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take some time, and the city engineers were predicting closure of Arlington 
Bridge by spring of 1971. It was therefore decided to go ahead in June 
with necessary land purchases for the original Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass 
bridge approaChes in order to keep options open. The land take involved 
purchasing the homes of six hundred local residents, and approval for cost 
sharing with the Provincial Government was obtained. As a final decision 
on the overpass had not been made, Metro policy was to buy properties as 
they came available on the market, but not to expropriate. 
l~ile these events transpired, Winnipeg Mayor Steve Juba approached 
C.P.R. about moving only its central yards and leaving the mainline in 
place. This he felt would expedite matters and reduce the high cost of 
the Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass. He was roundly criticized by Railway 
Study Committee Chairman Wolfe for interfering in a process already under 
investigation. At the same time, residents on the route of the bridge 
approaches were beginning to feel nervous, and uncertainty was causing 
neighbourhood deterioration and loss of Property values. Metro Transport 
Director, Harry Burns, said residents hadn't been contacted yet because a 
decision hadn't been made, and he felt there wasn't anything to worry about. 
Nonetheless, a community organizer from the Neighbourhood Services Centre, 
Tim Maloney, had begun working with the residents to help argue their case. 
In February 1971, the rail study consultants were asked to 
investigate the costs and feasibility of repairing Arlington Bridge, and 
by July 1, 1971, Metro approved $480,000 to repair the bridge and give it 
an extended life of five more years. This took the heat off an immediate 
19 
Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass decision, delayed possible expropriation 
proceedings and left uncertainty and the problems of neighbourhood 
deterioration. The North End Bridge Group, representing residents, 
immediately opposed the delay, feeling any decision was better than none 
since the latter left them trapped in a declining neighbourhood unable to 
sell or be expropriated at a price sufficient to buy comparable housing 
elsewhere. 
The rail consultants, however, presented a fifty page interim 
report in August 1971, stating that C.P.R. would be unlikely to move on 
their m~ and that it would be imprudent to make a decision on the 
Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass at that time which could be affected by 
proposals of the full rail study. 
Through 1970 and 1971 the Metro-Borm..rski debate on the bel t't..ray 
continued, with Borowski saying that money would be better spent on public 
transport. Metro responded by asking for more provincial aid for public 
transit but denied that this would affect the need for freeways. 
Finally, in November 1971, the Provincial Advisory Committee on 
Transportation (P.A.C.T.) that had been appointed by the province to look 
into W.A.T.S. produced a report attacking the entire recommended plan 
rather than specific local parts of it. 15 For the first time, a group of 
professionals debated the technical basis of the plan which they felt 
unduly favoured the automobile. But the criticism was less of the technical 
work than of the recommendation that followed. Five alternatives had been 
compared, and one was selected that was clearly beyond existing or fore-
15. Provincial Advisory Committee on Transportation, "Interim Report on 
Evaluation of W.A.T. Study', unpublished, November 25, 1971. 
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seeable future financial means. The reasons for this choice were obscure 
and amounted to selecting a plan which, it was hoped, would almost totally 
eliminate congestion. The selection of alternatives was also attacked 
with the claim that balanced public and private transport schemes of lower 
total cost were not examined. The Provincial Government reserved judgement 
at the time but the writing was on the wall. 
3.3 Unicitv 
The next step in the debate was, however, to be left to a new 
urban government. On December 23, 1970, the Provincial Government had 
published a white paper recommending amalgamation of Metro and the 
municipalities into a single unified government composed of fifty electoral 
wards grouped into thirteen community committees which would reflect local 
. d bl. . • i 16 1nterests an encourage pu 1c part1c1pat on. Councillors were to sit 
as members of both their o~m community committee and the central body. 
Each community committee was to have a Resident Advisory Group (R.A.G.), 
composed of non-paid citizens elected by those present at an annual 
community committee meeting. The purpose was to encourage more local 
participation. 
A political battle raged over the proposal throughout the spring, 
and finally Bill 36 was enacted by the Legislature on July 24, 1971. 
The local elections that followed in October were contested chiefly by a 
slate of N.D.P. candidates and a group calling itself the Independent Citizens 
Election Committee (I.C.E.C.). The chief issue was whether or not there 
16. Axworthy, Tom, op.cit. 
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should be party politics in local government. The major planning studies 
and issues were scarcely mentioned. 
The newly elected council, overwhelmingly I.C.E.C., took office 
on January 1, 1972, starting the area on the verge of a new phase in its 
history. 
22 
4. PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION 1972-1973 
The year of 1972 was one of growing debate on urban issues and, 
in particular, transport, as the Unicity council began to feel its way 
under the new system. A number of events set in motion under previous 
administrations were swiftly closing in and required immediate action. 
Much of the activity and the problems 'V7ere to be brought to a head and 
highlighted by the Winnipeg Railway Study. 
4.1 Suburban Protest 
A summary of the Rail Study technical report was published on 
May 15, 1972 and a preliminary recommendation was made public on June 22, 
1972.17 The full 400 page report was presented to Council on June 28. 
The report itself outlined and compared four alternative proposals for 
rail relocation. On the basis of the comparisons, the study team favoured 
one particular proposal known as Scheme 3. This would relocate the C.N.R. 
mainline from its existing route through the centre of the city to a new 
corridor following an electricity transmission line, and the proposed 
beltway route through the southern suburbs of St. Vital and Fort Garry. 
The C.P.R. mainline would similarly be moved from its path through north-
central l-Jinnipeg to a new location just inside the perimeter high'VYay on the 
northern extremity of the city. New yards would be situated inside the 
* perimeter on the westerly end of the new line. 
In July, with little time to absorb the study, Council went on 
record as favouring relocation in principle, but did not endorse any 
17. City of l<linnipeg, "l<linnipeg Railway Study" (short fonn), Damas and 
Smith Ltd., May 1972. 
* See Diagrams IV and V. 
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particular plan. In October the Federal Minister of Urban Affairs 
announced that the government would be increasing funds available for 
railway relocations, thereby giving the Winnipeg study greater impetus. 
In November public meetings were held in the Fort Garry and St. 
Vital Community Committee areas where the effects of relocation were 
expected to cause the most disruption. The four proposals were outlined 
and Scheme 3 met with strong opposition from one hundred residents in 
Fort Garry and two hundred in St. Vital who were not anxious to have 
core areas of the city rejuvinated at their own expense. The protests 
in these areas gave rise to a group calling themselves People First, 
and signalled the first stirrings of organized opposition to the city 
plans. 
During the same month Rail Study Chairman, Bernie Wolfe, in a 
speech to the Building Owners and Managers Association, called for quick 
action in moving the C.P.R. yards and mainline on the grounds that this 
portion of the plan was objectionable to noone. Re further urged early 
selection of a single plan followed by a phase of public participation to 
develop this plan in specific detail. At the same time, Mayor Juba 
criticized the lack of concern for people in the suburbs, and cited 150 
protest letters he had received as evidence. 
Finally, on November 29, 1972, the Rail Study Committee made an 
inform.al presentation to City Council, again explaining the four proposals 
and outlining a modified Scheme 3 that they hoped would reduce some of 
the earlier complaints. But this was not to be. The People First group 
arrived at the meeting four hundred strong, and presentations criticizing 
the proposals were made by spokesmen for the group. It was the largest 
turnout in the history of the Civic Centre. 
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Following this meeting, the C.N.R. Vice-President issued a statement 
saying that C.N.R. had no real desire to relocate, but would be willing 
to co-operate for the benefit of the city if asked to. Shortly thereafter, 
Hinnipeg's Executive Policy Committee of Council passed a resolution asking 
Council to hold some public meetings, to select one scheme in general 
outline, and then to give its approval for the detailed phase two of the 
study by February 1973. Local people wanted to participate before the main 
decision had been made, not just at the detailed stage, but time was 
beginning to close in. One final meeting in 1972 of an "informational" 
type was held in Hindsor Park suburb and "t<7as sparsely attended by about 
twenty residents. The informational formula, which then became the format 
for some later meetings, was used to portray the Technical Study Committee 
in a neutral, purely technical, role. The presentations were made by 
Technical Study Chairman Harry Burns who had no political responsibility 
and was, therefore, not to be portrayed as a villain. As many of the issues 
were indeed political, the format of restricting responses of residents to 
purely technical questions served to stifle citizen views and virtually 
eliminate any real participation. 
4.2 ?lans Progress 
~fuile public attention was focused on the Railway Study, the civic 
administration progressed with plans to implement the W.A.T.S. proposals. 
With unification, existing policies inherited from Metro were to be continued 
until such time as the new council made its Ol¥n policies. Environment 
Committee of Council had in fact been instructed to arrange a spring seminar 
for councillors to become acquainted with the major studies and form their 
ljll 
I 
I 
.. 
I 
' • I 
.. 
I 
• 
I 
• • 
• 
• 
• 8 
"' •liP 
.. 
.. 
.. 
• 
• d 
• 
• 
• 
• 6 
.. 
.. 
.. 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
" 
19 
Ill 
II 
N 
"' 
own policies, but in the meantime it was business as usual for the 
administration. 
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A newspaper article on September 16 revealed that most of the 
arterial projects included in the first phase of the W.A.T.S. plan had 
already been implemented. Many of these roads involved minimum community 
disruption and were quite compatible ~.rith the more modest alternatives 
tested in the W.A.T.S. study. But property acquisitions were also 
continuing on the more controversial freeway routes, and the next phase in 
the recommended implementation program would begin taking Winnipeg into 
the high speed era. Indeed, in December 1972, the 1973 Capital Estimates 
released by the administration 1 s Board of Commissioners included one-quarter 
million dollars for engineering design studies of the Hestern Freeway and 
the Grant Avenue extension, and both items passed their first scrutiny 
through the 't-Torks Committee of Council. \~That had been a distant fantasy 
or planner 1 s dream ~·ras now on the threshold of reality. In fact, the forward 
projections of road expenditures, revealed in the five-year capital budget 
estimates, indicated a massive expenditure increase on roads, both in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of the total budget. This should, if 
anything, have illustrated the real significance of the selected W.A.T.S. 
plan, but instead received little attention. 
4.3 Central Area Frustration 
While the rail relocation proposals ~vere causing concern in the 
suburbs, the central area \•:ras caught in the cross-fire of roads and rails. 
Some of the community organizations which had been working with the North 
End Bridge Group sensed the frustration of a small local group trying to 
28 
respond to a massive city-wide plan. Back in December 1971 they had 
initiated a three-month research project, funded by the Company of Young 
Canadians, to determine the feelings of local people and to plot a course 
of future action. As a result of this, the \,Jinnipeg Citizen Transit 
Committee (I.J.C.T.C.) had been formed to take a more comprehensive approach 
to participation. The H.C.T.C. ~1as a non-profit organization of citizens 
and professionals interested in supporting public transport as an alter-
native to ever-increasing roads. Their objective was to assist local 
neighbourhood groups as an information clearing house, exchanging ideas 
and pressuring City Hall. They hoped, in addition, to initiate a dial-a-
bus experiment. 
By the end of 1972 the raih..ray study had moved to the forefront of 
public discussion. The connections with the Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass 
were obvious and it appeared that events ~Jere moving quickly. A number of 
community organizations in the central area were being asked questions by 
concerned local residents, but they had little information to go on. 
4.4 Organization 
Responding to the need for more information, Neighbourhood Service 
Centre (N.S.C.) called a meeting of about a dozen social agencies and 
interested community groups for December 20, 1972. Each group reported its 
concerns and knowledge of the railway and road plans. Various individuals 
undertook to circulate information they had available before a further 
meeting called for January 17, 1973. The Institute of Urban Studies (I.U.S.) 
tvas to be publishing a special newspaper on Transport Planning in Hinnipeg 
on January 12, and this would be distributed. 18 
18. Institute of Urban Studies, Urban Issues, Special Edition on Transport 
Planning, University of Winnipeg, January 1973. 
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On January 9, members of I.U.S. and the University of Manitoba 
School of Social i-Jork appeared on a television panel show to discuss 
transport problems and to introduce the I.U.S. publication. This began 
a media campaign to promote public awareness of the issues. On January 12, 
the newspaper itself ~vas released, beginning a direct mail phase of the 
campaign. After the initial mailing to resident advisors, community 
groups, and municipal, provincial and federal politicians and administrators, 
the response from others quickly depleted all available copies. 
By the time of the second N.S.C. meeting, the material had been 
digested by the participating groups, and discussion quickly got down to 
the issues. Did those attending really feel there was a problem and, if 
s~what role could or should they play? Although reactions were very ad hoc, 
there was a grmv-ing con census that the link b et"t-:reen H. A. T. S • and Railway 
Relocation was the key issue. At these initial meetings there were no 
suburban representatives present, and views on removing the central yards 
and tracks were quite neutral, although it was felt that local people should 
have a say in planning the re-use of any lands released. The chief concern 
was that released land would be used for freeways, creating a greater degree 
of blight than existed at present. The first goal was to point out this 
danger and, if possible, to remove the W.A.T.S. threat. 
The discussion then turned to the question of action. Representatives 
from the Community Helfare Planning Council (C.H.P.C.) suggested holding 
some form of well-advertised public panel discussion or forum, with the aim 
of attracting media coverage and stimulating public debate. A subcommittee 
of the main group was fanned to pursue this idea, with C.i.J.P.C. undertaking 
to act as co-ordinator. A meeting was then called for the following week 
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to discuss content and approach. It ~..ras also decided to invite 
representation from Resident Advisory Groups (R.A.G.) and suburban 
communities to participate in the planning, as the issues were area-wide 
and a broadly based approach would be more effective. 
In the week before the first forum meeting, two events transpired 
that helped to crystallize the action plan. First of all, a series of 
articles on rail relocation by Val T.Jerier in the Hinnipeg Tribune 
explained the proposals, the advantages argued by the planners, and the 
problems outlined by the critics. He intervie~..red the planners about the 
charge that freeway routes were the basis for the rail relocation proposals 
and reported their denials that this was the case. 
Second, the city held the first of its public meetings on rail 
relocation since the November presentation to Council. The meeting was 
held at R.B. Russell School on January 22, and t.ras sponsored by four central 
area Community Committees. Advertised at public expense, the meeting drew 
a capacity crowd of 175 people. In this community, t..rhere rails t-rere to be 
removed, the study committee expected quite a different response from that 
in the suburbs. As it was, the meeting was quite subdued, debate was 
stifled, and little was said to ease the frustration of many present. 
The chairman of the meeting kept to the informational format. The 
initial presentation by the Rail Study Committee took two hours, with the 
four alternative plans being presented in tedious confusion. Neighbourhood 
benefits were described at length, but roads were never mentioned. The 
response to questions from critics was to dismiss freeways as only one 
remote possibility in a wide range of options for re-use, and one which 
would not take much land in any case. The Rail Committee urged that a 
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decision on railways should be made first, and then consideration of road 
needs could follow. The presentation using slides was, however, very 
professional and served as a powerful propaganda technique. 
4.5 Developin~ Strategy 
By the time of the first N.S.C. subcommittee meeting on January 24 
to discuss forums some opinions and ideas had begun to take shape. First, 
the city's meetings were too well controlled and the public had too little 
initial information on which to base their questions. The Rail Study 
Committee presentations were stressing the positive aspects and selling 
the package they felt was worthwhile. They would be contacting residents 
throughout the city in a series of meetings. The alternative, a couple of 
large forum meetings, would have a one-shot effect rather than a continuous 
impact. The group felt it would be better to plug into the city meetings, 
if possible, and generate debate by posing well prepared questions. 
If this could be done, it had several advantages. It would give 
the group greater exposure; it would present the public with two points of 
view at the same time, with an opportunity to cross-examine either party; 
and it would be easier to get people out to one rather than two ~eetings. 
Besides, it would be organizationally and financially preferable to take 
advantage of the city's advertising and hall arrangements. 
It was also obvious that, if this were to be done, the group's 
contributions would have to be kept short to allow time for questions and 
for full expression of citizen views. It would be necessary to concentrate 
on basic issues and to have clear, sophisticated and well substantiated 
arguments to counter the carefully prepared slide show of the Railway 
Committee. 
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It 't-7as therefore decided that the group tv-ould prepare their ovm 
slide show. After several modifications, agreement was reached on an 
outline prepared by I.U.S. which illustrated the connection between released 
railway mainlines and the proposed radial freeways of the W.A.T.S. plan. 
Finally, the subcommittee turned to an immediate problem. The 
Executive Policy Committee would be presenting a resolution to City Council 
that same evening asking for approval to appoint consultants to conduct 
a series of public rail meetings at all thirteen Community Committees. The 
expressed purpose was to give the subject a full airing, after which a 
decision would be made to adopt the most acceptable program or modified 
program and then proceed to design and implementation phases of the study. 
The group was concerned, based on the R.B. Russell School experience, that 
this would not result in a full discussion of community views and that, 
with consultants in control, they would be frozen out. 
That afternoon, several members of the group phoned their councillors 
and expressed these concerns. As it happened, some councillors who had 
attended the earlier meeting were of the same view and that night Council 
adopted instead a resolution calling for the Community Committees to arrange 
their own meetings, and for the city administration to make staff resources 
available on request. A deadline of May 1 'tvas set for the meetings to be 
completed. The door was open, but time was running short. 
The following week, a meeting of the main group was called at N.S.C. 
for progress reports. General agreement was reached on the forum strategy. 
Other members would provide feedback of residents' responses and notify the 
forum planners of questions that people wanted investigated. 
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4.6 Preparation 
February 'tvas a hectic month of preparation on two fronts, with 
I.U.S. and Pollution Probe developing the content of the slide presentation 
and the Community Welfare Planning Council (C.W.P.C.) refining and directing 
the organizational strategy. 
Events were changing quickly, and with new information becoming 
available almost daily, attempts were made to incorporate these into the 
group's presentation. Val Werier of the Tribune, continuing his series of 
articles on the railway issue, reported that the C.N.R. could vacate the 
massive East Yard area at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers 
without moving the mainlines. In earlier Rail Committee presentations, it 
t.ras argued that the release of this area ~muld result from rail relocation 
and this was presented as a major benefit of the program. The critics 
could now argue that this benefit could be achieved without moving the main-
lines. 
Else"t.rhere, a report by D. I. MacDonald, Chairm.an of the Board of 
Commissioners, urging a decision on the beltway by March 31, an Environment 
Committee recommendation to proceed with the original Sherbrook-McGregor 
Overpass design construction, and inclusion of one million dollars by the 
Works Committee in the Capital Estimates for the overpass land purchases, 
convinced the group of the urgency and importance of making their objections 
about W .A. T. S. clear immediately. It appeared obvious that the free~·Jay 
plan was being pushed hard and that it ~ras far from the remote possibility 
it was being made out to be. Unless it was debated before the rails 1-1ere 
removed, it would be a virtual fait accompli. 
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On February 15, a meeting of the forum subcommittee was held~ with 
several members of the parent group in attendance, as ~-vell as R.A.G. members 
from a few Community Committees, and representatives of A.C.T., an embryo 
central association of the R.A.G. groups. The aim agreed upon was to be 
included on the program at each of the Community Committee rail meetings. 
The desired format 'Cvould include presentations by the city and the forum 
group, considerable time for questions and expression of views by local 
residents, and an independent chairman such as the chairman of the Community 
Committee. It was suggested that this could be achieved through official 
channels, beginning -v1ith the R.A.G.s, <t-vhich had been incorporated into the 
ne't-v Unicity structure, largely v-rith the idea of creating a vehicle for local 
participation. 
The idea was to approach the R.A.G.s, explain the aims of the forum 
group, and ask them to adopt a resolution calling for the Community Committee 
to hold public rail meetings of the form suggested prior to the May 1 
deadline set by Council. They vmuld also be asked to assist in publicizing 
the meetings to get the widest possible participation. Ultimately, success 
would depend on whether the Community Committee councillors accepted the 
R.A.G. resolutions. 
This general approach was agreed upon, with some flexibility, 
depending on the situations in different Community Committees. In some 
cases the newly formed R.A.G.s were heavily involved with detailed work 
passed do'tvn to them by the councillors, and would not feel like taking the 
responsibility for such an initiative themselves. Other groups hardly 
existed, and in some cases the R.A.G.s ~-vould simply not be interested. For 
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these reasons, and partly because of the tight time schedule, it was 
agreed that the forum subcommittee would, where necessary, approach the 
Community Committee chairman either directly or throu~h the R.A.G. chairman, 
or would appear as delegations at Community Committee meetings. In the 
end all of the approaches were tried in different areas. 
Some members of the parent group who had not been involved in 
the forum subcommittee were concerned that the whole action program was 
being put together far too quickly, allowing too little time for a wider 
degree of public participation in its planning. With a May 1 deadline 
there seemed little alternative and it was decided to proceed nonetheless, 
with the hope that the groups' contribution would at least give local 
people a point of reference from which to begin. 
In order to establish initial contact, A.C.T. sent a letter to the 
chairmen of all the R.A.G. groups, introducing the advocates and describing 
their aims. The task of contacting R.A.G.s and Community Committees was 
then divided among several members of the group, and over the next couple 
of weeks a number of contacts were made and the process set in motion. 
During this period no firm dates or agreements on approach were reached, 
although there was evidence of interest and a few tentative meetings were 
scheduled. 
On February 27, a final meeting of the forum group was called to 
wind up the month of preparation before launching into the public campaign. 
The slide show had been completed and was presented to the group for the 
first time by members of I.U.S. and Pollution Probe. It received enthusiastic 
support, some suggestions for changes, and general agreement that it should 
remain as objective as possible, concentrating on the main issues decided 
on earlier. 
36 
Finally, members who had been contacting the Communitv Committees 
reported various experiences and degrees of success. It had become obvious 
that some name would be necessary to identify the group, and this had been 
specifically requested by some Community Committees for the purpose of 
advertising meetings. After some discussion, the name Coalition On 
Sensible Transport was decided on as a reflection of the group's composition 
and the subject. The monogram, C.O.S.T., aptly illustrated a major and 
important concern. A letterhead was designed on the spot and arrangements 
were made to have stationery printed. The group was now formally in business. 
4.7 Advocacy Action 
During the February preparations, things had been fairly quiet 
elsewhere, except for one raihmy meeting in East St. Paul, v7here one hundred 
residents turned out to protest relocation through their area. A fe~.;r 
suburban candidates, getting an early start for the anticipated provincial 
elections, had also begun to voice opposition. 
On Harch 1, the C.O.S.T. presentation received its first public 
airing at a Hanitoba Environment Council seminar. The sparsely attended 
meeting nonetheless received widespread coverage in the major newspapers 
and on radio the following day. Later that week, the C.O.S.T. presentation 
was shown at a panel discussion of the Central Area Council and by the 
lnnnipeg Citizens Transit Committee at a public meeting in St. James. On 
March 26 the Railway Study Committee had their say before the Manitoba 
Environment Council, and a different approach to that at R. B. Russell was 
taken. This time the consultants stated quite openly that the railway study 
had assumed that the freeway plan would be implemented. Although the 
presentation was limited to the Railway Committee, a representative of 
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C.O.S.T. was allowed a few minutes to make a statement from the floor. 
Although the c.o.s.T. objective to share a platform with the Railway 
Committee had still not been achieved, the meeting did stir considerable 
discussion, and again the c.o.s.T. issues received newspaper coverage. 
'(,Jhile these meetings '\.Jere taking place, work continued on the 
main strategy, bolstered somewhat by a letter to the R.A.G. chairman 
from the Community Planning Association of Canada, endorsing the C.O.S.T. 
presentation. In East Kildonan an appearance of a C.O.S.T. delegate to 
a regular Community Committee meeting, explaining the case, was sufficient 
to elicit an invitation to appear on the railway panel, and a date was 
set for the public meeting. In Fort Rouge and Lord Selkirk communities, 
presentations of the full slide show were made to the R.A.G.s prior to 
their deciding whether to recommend having C.O.S.T. appear at their nublic 
rail meetings. In the case of Fort Rouge, the R.A.G. proposal was accepted 
by the Community Committee and two public meetings were eventually held, 
although the format was not as planned. Only two of all the community 
meetings followed through exactly as intended. although the process helped 
develop a growing body of public contact and participation. 
Attendance at meetings was limited, but media coverage had expanded 
the audience 'tvell beyond the local, interested parties "'rho attended. The 
Hanitoba Environment Council meetings had been well covered in the city 
papers and radio, and comunity ne-,;.;rspapers had carried lengthy reports on 
the R.A.G.-C.O.S.T. meeting in Fort Rouge. Ecospeak and Prairie Dog Press 
had also published newspapers on transportation and city planning issues, 
broadening the scope still further. 
19. Ecospeak, Vol. 4 Issue 1, Winnipeg Pollution Probe Inc., March 1973; 
and Prairie Dog Press, Winnipeg, February 2, 1973. 
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The main point of the c.o.s.T. presentation linking the freeway 
and rail~~y plans was being well made, and was picked up by some councillors 
who had seen the presentation. The railvmy consultants were freely 
acknowledging the connection. But from the line of questionning that was 
emerging, it was becoming apparent that C. 0. S • T. t.;rould have to go the 
next step and question whether the freeways were necessary in the first 
place. Council had just approved $450,000 for unspecified road design 
studies and, based on past performance, these funds seemed slated for 
freeway plans. 
The long-awaited councillors' seminar was now planned for April 2 
and 3. The interrelationships between all the major plans would be discussed, 
after which Council would be asked to formulate policy guidelines. Faced 
with forceful recommendations from the city's transportation planners, 
councillors would need to be given clearly reasoned arguments if the c.o.s.T. 
position were to prevail. With this in mind, I.U.S. had already begun a 
technical critique of the W.A.T.S. recommendations. The critique attempted 
to explain the rationale behind the initial decision by interpreting the 
technical language implied in the W.A.T.S. report. It included, in addition, 
a cost benefit analysis of the plan that had not been done before, and also 
a number of alternative points of view. 
The original idea had been to ask for an opportunity to present this 
paper, entitled "!,Jhy IN' .A. T. S.", at the councillors' seminar. 20 As things 
turned out, the schedule was full and there was little or no provision made 
20. Partridge, Terry, "\my W.A.T.S.", Institute of Urban Studies, University 
of Winnipeg, March 1973. 
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for outsiders. The paper 't-Tas, nonetheless, mailed directly to the 
councillors, the planners, and various other interested groups. Furthermore, 
the author attended the meeting as an observer which provided the opportunity 
to discuss the paper privately with some councillors. 
4.8 Growing Debate: the Councillors' Seminar, Environment Committee, 
and Community Meetin~s 
The councillors' seminar shed less light than hoped for from the 
critics, but it did help to focus attention on major issues and begin the 
development of a policy line. The administrators voiced frustration 
at the lack of direction. They had prepared a development plan, a major 
transport plan (H .A. T. S.), a downtor,m development plan, and the railway 
study. They ~..!anted decisions to be made regarding implementation. Council 
was not in fact giving direction. Positions had not been taken in nublic 
debate during the election because that ~.ras not the nature of the supposedly 
non-partisan city politics. 
The administrators made presentations regarding all the plans, 
confirming quite clearly that the raih1ay study had assumed H.A.T.S. as a 
21 base. A strong defence of the freeway plans was made, and approval for 
implementation was asked. But the planners also seemed to want to keep the 
real issues out of planning. Chief Commissioner D. I. MacDonald reiterated 
the age-old philosophy of the Smith report, by asking Council to stop letting 
financial considerations interfere with the planning process. H. F. Burns., 
Director of Transportation, echoed this position saying that it had probably 
21. City of liTinnipeg, "Background Material For Seminar April 2nd and 3rd, 
1973", unpublished. 
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been a mistake putting a 767 million dollar price tag on implementation 
of the transportation study. 
The administration 7 s influence on policy 'tvas enormous. They had 
a monopoly control of the plans and the technical reasons that supported 
the plans. Council relied solely on them for advice. One councillor in 
a Freudian slip even referred to the administrators as "policy makers". 
Another councillor complained that the administrators were giving sales 
pitches for the development plans and were not presenting Council with 
alternatives. 
Nonetheless, an attempt ~-7as made to determine the views of 
councillors on various aspects of the plans in order to develop a statement 
of principle for later, formal debate by the full Council. Among other 
things, a majority of councillors present for the polling voiced disapproval 
of freeways, favouring instead increased support for public transit and 
the development of arterial roads. 
l~ile no arrangements were made for outsiders to make presentations 
to the seminar, the City Environment Committee had agreed instead to hear 
a brief from I.U.S. at their regular committee meetings. A brief was 
prepared and presented to the committee on April 16. 22 It began from the 
observation made at the seminar that the Council and administration held 
opposite positions on the subject of freeways and thereby created a 
stalemate. The general theme of the brief was that perhaps the problem 
could be straightened out if everyone understood the reasons behind the 
22. Axworthy, L. and Partridge, T., Presentation on Transportation Planning 
to Environment Committee, City of Winnipeg, Institute of Urban Studies, 
University of Winnipeg, unpublished report, April 16, 1973. 
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opposing views. Public hearings with a form of cross-examination were 
suggested. By way of example, the brief included a condensation of some 
of the more important points from "Why W.A.T.S.", presenting the reasons 
why the administration thought freeways were necessary and why !.U.S. felt 
that these reasons were faulty. The brief went on to reiterate the railway-
freeway connection, and this time suggested that an alternative rail 
rationalization scheme be studied involving removal of yards but not main-
lines. This was a solution that might be satisfactory to suburban and 
central city residents alike. It would not provide routes for radial 
freeways, but if the freeway plan was scrapped the routes would not be 
needed. 
The committee did not accept the stand on public hearings, but did 
pass a resolution recommending to Executive Policy Committee almost every 
point contained in the brief on urban trasnport and rail policy. The 
proposals were tabled, changed, and re-introduced on two or three occasions 
throughout the spring, finally culminating in recommendations to Council in 
mid-summer. 
Meanwhile, public discussion and debate was accelerating on several 
fronts. Val Werier had written an article explaining the basic critique of 
"tVhy W .A. T. S.", and asking if the taxpayer could afford it. C .0. S. T. 
presentations to organizations such as A.L.C.A.P. (Alliance of Churches, 
Agencies and Parishes) and Kiwanis continued and the main points received 
further newspaper coverage. Councillor Wolfe, speaking to the Rotary Club, 
lashed back at the rail critics, claiming negativism and misinformation, 
and posed the threat of no action whatever unless agreement were reached on 
the options proposed by the Rail Study Committee. 
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Shortly after this, hoax letters from an organization calling 
itself Western Ontario Land Founding Enterprises (W.O.L.F.E.) were sent 
to residents on Waverly Street in River Heights and to residents in the 
Lord Selkirk community. The letters claimed that their streets would be 
turned into major thoroughfares, and the company offered to purchase their 
property before values fell too far. Initially the residents were up in 
arms, until the hoax was revealed. The originators of this claimed in a 
newspaper interview that the purpose had been to make the implication of 
long-term W.A.T.S. plans immediate and thereby stimulate interest and 
debate before it was too late. 
About this time, Guidelines For The Seventies was published by 
the Provincial Government, calling for a revised urban transport plan, and 
finally, during the election, the New Democratic Party came out in support 
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of public transport and in opposition to freeways. 
During this period, the main campaign of community rail meetings 
had begun. Much of the new information and events were incorporated into 
the c.o.s.T. presentation requiring constant revisions and updating. It 
was no longer necessary to demonstrate so strongly that the rail proposals 
had assumed the freeways as a base, but simply to state that this was the 
case, and was a matter of public record. The point was then made that many 
councillors and others were opposed to freeways, and therefore other rail 
schemes should be investigated as it would no longer be necessary to provide 
radial freeway routes. 
23. Manitoba Government, "Regional Perspectives", Guidelines For The 
Seventies, Vol. 3, April 1973. 
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The first of the series of organized community rail meetings was 
held in the Fort Rouge area at Churchill High School on April 24. Somehow 
wires were crossed and the city representatives failed to show. C.O.S.T. 
made a presentation and tried to fill in some of the gaps they had expected 
the city to do. About fourty people attended, including some local 
councillors. 
The second meeting was held at Grant Park High School for residents 
in the West End of Fort Rouge and in the Assiniboine Community Committee 
area. There was a fair turnout of about eighty people, sparked partly by 
the hoax W.O.L.F.E. letter that had appeared the day before. This time 
presentations were made by the city and by c.o.s.T. The city representative, 
apparently unaware of the scheduled format, was not prepared to debate. 
It was agreed instead that he would make his presentation and answer 
questions first before leaving the platform to C.O.S.T. While the planned 
debate did not materialize, it was nonetheless the first time that the two 
presentations and points of view were heard at one meeting. 
The next two meetings went more or less according to format. In 
Fort Garry on May 7, the railway committee was represented by the consultants 
Damas Smith. Presentations by Smith and c.o.s.T. sparked a lively and 
informative debate. The well attended meeting proved very satisfactory to 
many present including members of the People First group who had launched 
the first suburban revolt. On May 15 a meeting in the Midland Community 
heard presentations from c.o.s.T. and city representatives, and again a 
lively debate ensued. 
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During the April-May period there had been considerable difficulty 
getting some of the meetings organized. Several were cancelled or post-
poned, and c.o.s.T. was forced to keep revising plans throughout. There 
were rumblings that city technical staff were not pleased at the prospect 
of entering a political debate, or of defending plans that were officially 
a product of the five party consortium, even though they had played a major 
role in preparing them. 
Early in June c.o.s.T. discovered that a fresh round of meetings 
were to be organized, this time going back to the original idea of 
contracting the job out to the consultants. All of the Community Committees 
were to be included in five regional groups. The meetings were to begin 
the following week and be completed ten days later. 
A c.o.s.T. meeting was promptly called on June 8. As the c.o.s.T. 
presentation was no longer included on the public meeting agendas, it was 
decided to distribute a handout at the door outlining the c.o.s.T. position 
instead. 
As the public meetings had been arranged with indecent haste, and 
little apparent publicity, it was decided to boost attendance with a c.o.s.T. 
press release sent to all media. The release stated who was holding the 
meetings, the place and the time. It announced the reasons why c.o.s.T. 
wanted a good turnout and included a copy of the handout entitled, "Concerns 
of C.O.S.T.". This last sheet covered most of the main points made in 
earlier presentations, plus the new information that the historic site at 
the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers might not be released for 
parkland after all, as C.N.R. and Great West Life Company were negotiating 
about a new office building there. 
45 
The first public meeting of the new round took place two days 
later for the Centennial and Midland Communities. Members of c.o.s.T. 
arrived to distribute the handbill. Following the official presentation, 
a motion was put from the floor asking to see the c.o.s.T. presentation. 
The motion was passed almost unanimously by the people present and the 
show went on. A good debate followed similar to the Fort Garry meeting. 
The next day, the meeting and the c.o.s.T. viewpoint received good coverage 
on radio, television and both city papers, prompted largely by the c.o.s.T. 
press release. 
The remaining four meetings were attended by c.o.s.T. solely in 
a watching capacity without further presentations. "Concerns of c.o.s.T." 
was circulated at each, and the points raised were often picked up by the 
people. In addition, the c.o.S.T. points were covered by the community 
newspapers with the Fort Lance reprinting the sheet almost verbatim. An 
editorial in the Leisure section of the Free Press also gave c.o.S.T. and 
its concerns good play. The final meeting of the series signalled also 
the end of c.o.S.T. activities for the summer. 
4.9 Resolution 
On July 18, 1973, the new Unicity council produced its first general 
policy statement on the major city plans. 24 This was a culmination of 
the process officially set in motion by the councillors' seminar back in 
April. Many of the resolutions were vague, and the voting roll went 
unrecorded. Nonetheless, in an important statement of principle, Council 
24. City of Winnipeg, Minutes, Council Chamber, Winnipeg, July 18, 1973. 
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decided to reject freeways in favour of an expanded arterial street system, 
with increased emphasis on public transport. This reversed the position 
taken by the former Metro Council, and in so doing, realized one of the 
principle aims of c.o.s.T. 
But, even as the resolution was being reached, an old battlefront 
was opening once again. At the same meeting a proposal to proceed with the 
Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass was sent back pending receipt of an environmental 
impact study as called for in the City of Winnipeg Act. This action was 
prompted by a large turnout of people known as the MCKenzie Residents Group, 
who opposed the creation of a major thoroughfare down their quiet 
residential street as a result of the planned overpass. The conflict that 
had set many other events in motion was still alive, but this time a better 
policy framework existed for its solution. 
At a further meeting on August 1, Council refused to endorse rail 
relocation in principle, but after consideration of the consultants' 
report on the community meetings, asked for a further study of a "Do Nothing" 
option. 25 This option would essentially leave it to the railways as to 
whether they wished to move their yards or not for commercial reasons. 
The consultants' report that had accurately summarized the prevalence of 
suburban protesters at meetings, had ignored the c.o.s.T. compromise calling 
for study of positive action on yard removal, leaving the mainlines where 
they are. They were opting instead for an all or nothing approach which 
threatened to put centre against suburb, now that the common interest brought 
on by the freeways was no longer at hand. It was left to await results of 
the further study. 
25. City of Winnipeg, Minutes, Council Chamber, Winnipeg, July 18, 1973. 
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5. PERSPECTIVE 
The contribution of c.o.s.T. to the events of 1973 constituted 
but one element in a complex planning process characterized by changing 
institutions, technologies and political debate. While organized action 
by community interest groups on planning issues is by no means new to 
Winnipeg, the degree of organization on an area-wide basis, the use of 
professionals, and the level of technical debate did represent a novel 
dimension. 
The amount of exposure was quite extensive in relation to the 
effort although it did, nonetheless, involve a considerable amount of 
time by a number of individuals. The motivating force was provided by 
voluntary concerned citizens. It was facilitated in large measure by 
the existence of several publicly funded organizations able to provide 
manpower on a part-time basis for the various technical, organizational, 
informational, and clerical tasks. 
The future of this form of activity may, therefore, depend on 
the judgement of voluntary participants and public funding bodies as to 
the effectiveness and value of this form of involvement, and on the need 
arising from social and economic forces demanding change. 
Judgement on the principle of advocacy is likely to be based on 
the strength of theoretical arguments, both for and against, concerning 
its role in the planning process, and on experience of it in practice. 
Local government in Winnipeg and elsewhere in North America has 
traditionally been viewed as a non-political but democratic institution, 
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charged with the efficient management of local services and evaluated 
by the public, through elections~ on its soundness of judgement. The 
continuing prevalence of this view was aptly demonstrated in the 1971 
Unicity election by the lack of debate on issues and by the charge that 
politics would interfere with good management. In a similar manner, 
planning has been regarded as a difficult but non-political activity, 
requiring only technical co-ordination and foresight to insure efficient 
and orderly development. Organized opposition and debate in this regard 
is seen as time-consuming, obstructive, short-sighted and costly. 
Against these views are the theoretical arguments in favour of 
advocacy advanced by Paul Davidoff in 1965. 26 Describing the process, 
he says, 
"The idealized political process in a 
democracy serves the search for truth 
in much the same manner as due process 
in law. Fair notice and hearings, 
production of supporting evidence, cross-
examination, reasoned decision are all 
means to arrive at relative truth: a 
just decision. Due process relies 
heavily upon strong advocacy by a 
professional. The advocate represents 
an individual, group or organization. 
He affirms their position in language 
understandable to his client and the 27 decision makers he seeks to convince." 
He feels the advocate can play a useful role by, 
"making more apparent the values under-
lying plans and making definitions of 28 
social costs and benefits more explicit." 
26. Davidoff, Paul, op.cit. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid. 
He also feels that the advocate can play a useful role in 
developing alternative plans that, 
"represent the deep-seated convictions 
of their proponents, and not just the 
mental exercises of rational planners 29 
seeking to portray the range of choice." 
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The advantages he sees in this particular approach to planning 
are: 
1. A means of better informing the public of the alternative choices 
open to them. 
2. Forcing the public agency to compete with other groups to win 
political support, and to thereby improve the quality of their work. 
3. Forcing the critics to produce superior plans. 
The arguments advanced by Davidoff have a fairly general 
application. The concept may, however, be taking on a growing importance 
in the context of the transport history described in previous chapters. 
In the pre-war period transport decisions were taken at a fairly local 
level, to handle local traffic problems, and were based on quite unsophis-
ticated arguments. Under these conditions, a form of pluralism involving 
local interest groups was a reasonably valid possibility. With the 
increasing geographic and functional centralization that took place for 
the next thirty years, and the increasing technical sophistication of 
planning methods on an area-wide basis, the opportunity for expression 
of local points of view has diminished. 
Much of this centralization and consolidation was a valid response 
to developing problems and kept well in time with advances in planning 
29. Ibid. 
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theory. The concept of advocacy planning could well be the next stage 
in the progression, preserving the positive comprehensive features of the 
earlier changes, but introducing a form of pluralism on a geographically 
centralized basis. 
c.o.s.T. did not, however, emerge from some calculated progression 
in planning theory. It grew rather from an ad hoc, spontaneous reaction 
to an immediate problem. There were, nonetheless, striking similarities 
in terms of the group composition and strategies to the theoretical 
concept described by Davidoff and also to actual experience elsewhere, in 
30 Toronto and Boston. 
The experience confirmed the effectiveness of technical briefs, 
slide shows, direct mailings, handouts, and press releases in presenting 
a position and in obtaining wide media coverage of the issues. Operating 
through the new Community Committee structure by way of Resident Advisory 
Groups was an avenue not available in Toronto and Boston. Although this 
approach had a mixed success, it was an interesting application for the 
newly convened groups who were themselves still trying to establish a 
role. Some of the problems were in any case, beyond their control. 
The effectiveness of the c.o.s.T. effort cannot, however, 
ultimately be gauged in terms of inches of newsprint or radio and television 
network time. In terms of actual attendance at meetings, less than one 
thousand people viewed the presentations. l~ile it is likely that a fair 
number of councillors were exposed to the C.O.S.T. line at one time or 
another, it is impossible to estimate how many of the general public were 
30. Lupo, Colcord, Fowler, op.cit. 
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actually reached by the media coverage. More importantly, there is little 
evidence, beyond the circumstantial coincidence of decisions, to suggest 
that the coverage helped to clarify issues or had an important effect on 
the judgements of either councillors or the public. 
The value of the debate in terms of the quality of decision-making 
is yet more difficult to ascertain. Perhaps the best that could be done 
would be to measure the effectiveness, as described by Davidoff, in 
providing the ingredients "to arrive at relative truth". 31 
The future of the advocacy role in the planning process will 
depend upon a number of factors. As Winnipeg moves closer to the big 
city leagues, the pressures of growth and the efforts of the planners to 
accommodate it are likely to produce increasing strains, conflict, and the 
emergence of more organizations like the Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass Group 
(S.M.O.G.) and the MCKenzie Residents Group, and a consequent demand for 
technical advice. 
If groups like these are provided with institutionalized channels 
for dissent in the form of public hearings, with provision for submission 
of evidence and cross-examination of technical witnesses, then the advocacy 
role would be greatly aided and a basis could be established for more 
informed decisions. In addition, greater public accessibility to technical 
city planning reports would assist the advocates and lead to more informed 
debate. The availability of advocates is likely in the long run, however, 
to depend on the provision of funding. The existence of I.u.s. and 
Pollution Probe in this case provided a ready avenue for technical support. 
31. Davidoff, Paul, op.cit. 
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In the future, various organizations such as political parties, chambers 
of commerce, social agencies and ad hoc protest associations may be 
interested in performing an advocacy role. Some will have internal funds, 
but others may need support from foundations, and perhaps the Federal or 
Provincial Governments, so that professional advocates can be drawn from 
a variety of places. 
In the meantime, the embryo c.o.s.T. maintains a watchful eye on 
city plans. 
NOTE: Many of the references to events and dates mentioned in this 
report were gathered from newspaper articles in the Winnipeg 
Free Press and the Winnipeg Tribune, and from the author's 
personal experience as the I.U.S. member on c.o.s.T. 
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